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ESSAY
WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW
33:3 Summer 1997

FABLES, SAGAS, AND LAWS
SAUL
I.

P. LEVMORE*

INTRODUCTION

The fables of my title refer to stories such as those collected
under the name of Aesop.1 One famous fable is the source of
the common reference to "a wolf in sheep's clothing." The wolf
infiltrates the fold but is then devoured for dinner.2 A fable
often concludes with a moral. 3 Here, as in many other cases, it is
the rather rigid and anticlimactic "Appearances can be deceiv* Brokaw Professor of Corporate Law and Albert Clark Tate, Jr., Professor, University of Virginia.
This talk was delivered as the 1997 Paulus Lecture at Willamette University College of Law. I am most grateful to my colleagues and new friends at Willamette for
comments on this particular topic and, more generally, for their extraordinary hospitality. I am indebted to Jerome McGann, Julie Roin, and Pam Karlan for discussions on
some of the topics touched on in this Essay.
1. For the canonical collection of the earliest texts, see 1 AESOPICA: GREEK AND

LATIN TExTs (B.E. Perry ed., 1952). A convenient translation of the most popular
fables is FABLES OF AESOP (S.A. Handford, trans., 1954).

2. The particular fable is more interesting than most of us recall. The wolf dresses
in costume in order to gain entry. He succeeds. But before he can do any harm, the
shepherd comes out for dinner and, aiming to consume one of his own sheep, chooses

the wolf, who has blended into the flock too successfully.
3. For discussion of the difference between these moral-oriented fables and the
original fables in their larger narrative contexts, see GREGORY NAOY, THE BEST Or
THE ACHAEANS 280-88 (1979).
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ing," although we can sketch in the more subtle "Beware deception-but immoral deceivers beware!" Such animal-based fables
were passed down in many societies. 4 Diverse peoples apparently perceived foxes as cunning and wolves as cruel, for example. They also shared the habit of communicating norms
regarding human behavior through the camouflage animals
provide.5
By the term "saga," I refer to a story handed down in a
family or culture, dealing with actual or implied ancestors.6 I am
especially interested in those that bear some relationship to legal
rules. I will dwell on one story about an ancestor who went
bankrupt, eventually recovered and re-entered the middle class,
and then labored to repay old creditors even though he need not
have done so. It may not be as vivid as the wolf in sheep's clothing, but it comes with its share of provocative applications. I
have been collecting such family-legal sagas for several years
now in order to substantiate a theory of the survival of these
stories or, dare I say, myths-for it is their transmission, rather
than truth, that is of interest. It is this theory that I hope to spin
out here.
The short form of my thesis proceeds in four steps. (1) Stories survive if they resonate with audiences; (2) this resonance
reflects discomfort, at least at the level of popular culture, with
particular legal rules; (3) this discomfort or uneasiness often coincides with theoretical (or highbrow) problems regarding the
same rules; and (4) this discomfort also signals instability and the
potential for reform in an area of law. I will not say we should
take up the call for reform whenever sagas converge on a legal
rule, for popular conceptions may be the product of misconcep4. On the distinction between casual folktales (with animal fables as a subset) and
cosmic myths, see G.S. KIRK, MYTH: ITS MEANING AND FUNCTION IN ANCIENT AND

31-41 (1970).
5. George Orwell's Animal Farm and Disney's Toy Story are more modem examples. In many cultures, the camouflage is meager and the animal-based stories are simple; but this is not universally the case.
It is interesting that, in contemporary sentiment, foxes are regarded as cunning and
wolves as predators-but not as particularly cruel. And the old fables that are most
familiar today include ones with clever foxes and hungry wolves, but those with cruel
wolves seem to be of less interest. I will leave for another day, however, a deeper
investigation of these fables. I warrant that they are especially interesting from a law
and economics perspective.
6. My label is unfaithful to the tradition that sometimes sagas concern a series of
stories.
OTHER CULTURES
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tions. However, I am claiming that law from the bottom up has
something to teach us, and that we might even be able to predict
a change in the law based on these stubborn sources of sagas.
At the same time, I will address the moral quality of these
sagas. Aesop offers fairly straightforward animal stories. Family
and tribal hand-me-downs are often remarkable for their moral
and behavioral complexity. Much can also be said about other
kinds of parables and their purposes, but I will venture into the
saga literature only as I conclude. This emphasis on what survives in family and local lore allows me to focus on the legal
component of sagas.
II.

BANKRUPTCY

Returning to the bankruptcy saga, I found, as I have discovered in many families, that my own paternal grandfather was in
business and-perhaps through no fault of his own but rather
because of a general economic downturn-lost all that he had
accumulated. His family endured bankruptcy and then poverty.
Eventually he succeeded in a new business and repaid old creditors. He was not required by law to repay these creditors, for his
debts had been discharged in bankruptcy. These voluntary payments were not easy to make, and his family struggled behind
him through these difficult periods. There is a family Bible in
which my father keeps a letter from one of Grandfather's trade
creditors. It thanks the debtor for his belated and legally unrequired payment and marvels at what an unusual and honorable
person he has been. A thrill travels through my spine when I
read that letter. I once told this story and was surprised when
two of four listeners had remarkably similar stories to tell
about
7
their own ancestors. I have since heard others as well.
There is something interesting about the fact that we do not
quickly ridicule the behavior that is superficially exalted in the
bankruptcy saga. The post-bankruptcy payments (and any admiration of them) seem to reflect ignorance of law and economics
analysis and perhaps a kind of moral narrow-mindedness as well.
The interest rate originally charged to debtors like my grandfa7. "Urban legends" have a similar unsettling quality of eliciting parallel experiences-or at least those attributed to a "friend of a friend"-from listeners. See, e.g.,
JAN H. BRUNVAND, THE BABY TRAIN (1993); JAN H. BRUNVAND, CURSES! BROILED
AGAIN (1989).
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ther must have incorporated the prospect of various business
failure scenarios. The interest rate also reflected the costs of
fraud, but the analysis here assumes that there is no evidence of
wrongdoing on the part of the debtor; bankruptcy must have
been caused by bad luck, a general business downturn, or even
poor (but honest) management. 8 By paying the old creditors,
Grandfather gave them double payment in a sense. There is,
moreover, a case to be made for preferring other sorts of postrecovery expenditures. Many people recover from bankruptcy
and turn to philanthropy, and perhaps we should prefer one who
gives a substantial percentage of his wealth to charitable causes
over one who turns this wealth over to banks and ex-suppliers.
As a moral matter, if a post-bankruptcy debtor asks whether to
donate to charity or to old creditors, most of us would prefer the
charity over business creditors.
Imagine, however, that our legal system contained bankruptcy rules designed not around the dual goals of saving the
debtor from inefficient disintegration and providing the debtor
with a fresh start, but rather around the first of these ideas
alone. 9 The law could remove the incentive for creditors to rush
in inefficiently and disassemble the debtor while doing as little
violence as possible to existing creditors' claims. Current law extends the all-or-nothing character of bankruptcy by offering the
debtor a completely fresh start. It is plausible that (ex ante)
creditors and debtors would prefer a rule that merely suspended
creditors' claims and awaited the debtor's recovery. Such a rule
would remove some of the debtor's incentive to recover and
prosper; but it would also lower interest rates because the prospect of bankruptcy would be less costly to creditors. This Essay
is not the place to develop details; the point is simply that our
bankruptcy law offers a completely fresh start when it is possible
that something less than that would work as well or better. At
some point, this sort of system would resemble reorganizations
8. If there were affirmative wrongdoing, then the argument against repaying creditors would be flawed much as it is mistaken to justify shoplifting with the claim that the
storekeeper's prices take some shoplifting into account.
9. These ideas, along with the nonwaivability of the full discharge rule in bankruptcy, are discussed in THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 10-17, 225-48 (1986) (discussing the fresh start policy, the inability of individual
borrowers to gain lower interest rates in return for opting out of full discharge, and the
desirability of preventing creditors from rushing to disassemble debtors).
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where the maturity of credit arrangements is extended by law or
where creditors receive equity in the surviving firm. 10
If this claim about bankruptcy law is correct as a theoretical

matter, then my larger point can be completed: the sagas suggest a preference for a world in which debtors who recover repay

their old creditors, and these sagas may have pinpointed a legal
rule correctly-namely, full discharge in support of a complete
fresh start-which will prove unstable because of its questionable foundations and inconsistency with that preference. Put dif-

ferently, if bankruptcy law compromised between these regimes,
and required that recovered debtors pay the old creditors some

fraction of their claims (or their full claims sans interest), I am
confident that most observers would prefer that a debtor who
then contemplated making a larger repayment than required be
encouraged to donate the excess to charity, rather than to the
cause of fuller compensation for ex-creditors.
In short, the observation here is that many people are uncomfortable with individual bankruptcy law and its form of a
fresh-start policy. Much as lawyers come to expect judges to ex-

hibit discomfort with secured creditors' priorities because the
moral and economic arguments for these priorities are difficult,
so too nonlawyers' experiences reflect discomfort with rules that

at least nominally prefer the debtor's fresh start to the sanctity of
earlier promises between debtor and creditors.
An alternative, and somewhat opposing, view is more opti10. Thus, it is interesting that many sagas (and movies) involving bankruptcy law
are about personal bankruptcies with the family business at stake. These businesses
often deal with suppliers or lenders that are themselves likely to survive any crisis
through reorganization or other legal means. Thus, a family whose farm is sold in a
foreclosure proceeding might be puzzled or embittered by the fact that a change in
economic circumstances cost them their farm, while a comparable change in circumstances allows a large oil company either to regard contracts for the sale of oil as somehow excused or to lead to the mere reorganization (but survival) of the company. The
comparison is obviously more complicated (inasmuch as the farmer gets to keep all his
human capital and also can enjoy excuses if grain prices change dramatically); but the
point is that sagas draw attention to subtle and unstable rules. Bankruptcy and reorganization laws are indeed ever-changing.
Comparative lawyers will note that the discussion in the text suggests that we might
find variety rather than uniformity in bankruptcy law over a range in which creditors
are prevented uniformly from disassembling debtors but where debtors are offered different degrees of encouragement to produce profit in the future. See Saul Levmore,
Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43-65 (1987); Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 31 TULANE L. REV. 235-87 (1986).
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mistic about the development of legal rules. Moral intuitions are
reflected in sagas, as before, but lawmakers are a product of the
same culture that produces and is shaped by these stories.
Therefore, the legal rules we find are influenced already by these
sagas. In the bankruptcy case, the law may anticipate that some
private players will invest in their own reputations by paying
debts that otherwise could be forgiven legally. Sagas serve the
role of reminding people about this option of doing more than
the law requires. Under this view, the sagas do not signal instability in the law. I find this perspective a bit too optimistic, given
the prevalence of sagas in those very areas in which substantial
legal change has been relatively frequent. Bankruptcy is one of
those areas.
III.

OTHER SAGAS AND DIscoMFoRT WITH LAW

There is no shortage of examples of this connection between
sagas and popular discomfort with legal rules. Numerous sagas
deal with opportunistically broken promises, and, correspondingly, the theory of efficient breach is the subject of vigorous
academic disagreement. Similarly, many sagas involve immigration experiences. Visa preferences and other pieces of immigration law indeed are controversial and sometimes difficult to
defend. A colleague of mine reports that his great-grandfather
was detained at Ellis Island, swam ashore, slept on a park bench
in New York's Central Park, and stumbled into two co-villagers;
with their help he married, began a business, prospered, chaired
the local victory bonds campaign, and became a citizen through
a private bill that was introduced after it was discovered that this

victory-bonds stalwart was an illegal immigrant. I have repeated
this tale before audiences, often with more than a hint of skepticism in my voice; and invariably some member of the audience
comes forward to report a similar saga closer to home. Aesop
would infer that small-time, well-intentioned lawbreaking is fine
if you prosper prior to detection, for it is the underlying human
essence that matters. ("Moral: The spirit of a rule is more important than its details.") I would say that there is something to

be said for a tournament not outside our gates, but inside; for the
former excludes more people than we like to think. 1 This immi11. See Saul Levmore, Unconditional Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REv. 807 (Dec.
1996) (describing social tastes that permit tournament-like processes among applicants
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grant proved that he was deserving, and his minor if implausible
lawbreaking is the stuff of admiring legends. The real message
of this recurring saga is that immigration law is unstable. And
indeed, it has proved so.
Another representative story and subject revolves around
the making and losing of real estate fortunes. Many people tell
of an ancestor who sold land to a buyer who then reaped a fortune when the path of an interstate highway was announced and
land prices skyrocketed. A law professor friend of mine reports
that his ancestor received an option as a sales commission and
through that option he bought the entire company for which he
had worked (so terrific were his sales skills and so badly drafted
was the option). In short order, this salesman lost the fortune
when he sold the firm to a buyer who had an informational advantage in the real estate market.
One function that such stories play is educational and psychological. A parent who hands down this saga can be seen as
saying, "Do not worry about our poverty or middle-class life and
the correlation between intelligence and wealth. Your gene pool
is just fine. Hard work and intelligence make for success. Our
family simply had a stroke of bad luck." A more subtle feature
of this saga is that it reflects the discomfort every first-year law
student feels upon learning how little law concerns itself with
incentives for telling the truth. A buyer who knows of a coming
interstate highway (or a contracting party who can see that the
other party to his contract has failed to provide for an extreme
eventuality) need not disclose this information. We should expect numerous stories about this unsettling legal rule. The option saga is especially ironic because the very fellow who profits
from a fancy option that was drafted too plainly (with no ceiling
or inflation protector) is then ironically hoisted when he sells
land without retaining an option to share in the next buyer's
gain. It goes almost without saying that nonlawyers, or perhaps
noneconomists, are quite suspicious of options.
Other sagas I have collected converge on the law of finders
(possession is but nine-tenths in the law), the law of intellectual
property protection, the law of government takings of private
property, and so forth. These, too, reflect vulnerable legal rules
for immigration rights but abhor explicit competition among applicants who already
have permeated a country's borders).
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about which theorists disagree-and regarding which nonlawyers understandably might exhibit discomfort. Popular culture

has a way of conveying important truths about social organization and control. Lawmakers and legal academics might do well
to pay attention to law and morality from the bottom up, and to
be especially careful that formal rules that oppose these founda-

tions really do make sense.
IV.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND CONTEMPORARY SAGAS

Let me dwell on a final set of stories that I will describe as

implicating the law of wrongful discharge. A family discovers
that a silver dish has been stolen and, after carefully retracing
the steps of all who had access to their home, they discharge
their maid. Three years later, they travel to England and see the
missing silver dish in a friend's home. They recollect that, in
fact, the friend's son had been in the United States as a college
exchange student and had been a weekend guest at their home

when the silver dish disappeared. They are horrified and reclaim
the dish.12 The story, along with all the others retold here, is
typical. 13 Aesop might have provided a version that pointed to

the importance of cautious factfinding and to the tragedy of assuming too quickly that maids are more likely to be criminal

than are one's own acquaintances.
I suggest that we focus our interest on the difficulty of rectifying the wrong done to the maid. The discharge of the maid
might have been supportable. Yet, the maid's extralegal loss is
likely to exceed the affluent college kid's extralegal (reputa-

tional) loss upon detection. It is by no means clear whether the
12. As the story was told to me, the son gave the dish to his own parents as a gift,
and he returned the dish when the visiting owners threatened to disclose its source. As
is often the case with these sagas, the details cast a shadow on the central tale. If the
rightful owners repossess the dish without saying a word, the thief's parents may regard
them as thieves. I have imagined a conversation among the four adults, but the saga
may be passed on with the implausible ending reported here, to discourage the next
generation in the dish-owning family from bringing the matter up in conversation when
they meet their English acquaintances.
Another possibility is that by not confronting the friends (his parents), the willingness to minimize the thief's loss from detection subtly highlights the treatment and social standing of the maid who was fired after a presumably one-way conversation.
13. Similar stories involve expensive and easily identifiable clothing that is missing
and then discovered in the home of a friend. The stories may survive because of a
fascination with, or wishful thinking about, the stupidity of thieves or their subconscious
desire to have their wrongdoing discovered.
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maid should have a legal claim-and in any event, such a claim
likely would go unmade. In fact, the maid almost surely has no
cognizable claim in our legal system. 4
Collecting these stories has made me think that a cultural
norm could develop in which the wrongdoer is asked to repent
and self-educate by mailing a substantial sum of money to the
maid. It may even be healthy for there to be a norm that encouraged the (mistaken-discharging) family to "atone" by
matching that payment. A formal legal rule of this latter kind
may be unworkable because, in the shadow of such a liability
rule, dischargers will decline to pursue the truth even as new
facts or suspicions arise. On the other hand, with such a practice
in place, we might have fewer tragic stories.
My immediate point is that the prevalence of these sagas,
with endings that can be seen as bittersweet (truth uncovered,
half-justice done, but the poor maid still in bad straits), focuses
attention on at-will employment (although these discharges
probably would be regarded as reasonable for non-at-will employees as well), wrongful discharge, defamation, and tortious
interference with contract or business opportunity. All these
subjects are very difficult in theory and practice. And in this
case, asking ourselves how law or practice would need to be reformed in order to avoid these moral quandaries suggests something like a restitution remedy.1 5 This is not the place to sketch
such a remedy or legal reform, but I think that its potential is
fairly clear.
V.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND ANCIENT SAGAS

Among the most penetrating and long-lived sagas are those
found in the Bible and classical literature. A good number of
stories found in the Bible and in Homer can be understood as
occupying a middle ground between Aesop and our immediate
14. The maid has no claim against the employer for wrongful discharge because
the discharge was mistaken but not legally wrongful. Moreover, as noted presently in
the text, any recovery against the employer could be counterproductive because it
would discourage the employer from pursuing the truth or from informing the maid of
what was learned after her departure. The maid has no claim against the thief because
her injury is not proximate to his wrongdoing. He has neither directly nor maliciously
caused her loss.

15. Casting the remedy as restitutionary might suggest payment from the wrongdoer who was enriched by the stolen item. It makes payment from the employer seem
even less likely than before because the employer was not enriched in any sense.
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ancestors' tales; their human character introduces flawed, multidimensional heros. Some of these heros generate simple
morals, while others (dare I say modem ones) are of a piece with
more contemporary, locally transmitted sagas. This is not the
place to explore the legal simplicity of animal fables and the rel-

ative complexity of stories using human or demigod action
figures. It is probably not a matter of evolving sophistication because6 some of these complex human stories are obviously very
old.'

Perhaps the best-known wrongful discharge story bears this
attribute of legal complexity, if only because the human characters are all flawed and thus multidimensional. There is the story

of Joseph, 17 who finds himself wrongfully accused by the wife of
Potiphar, Pharaoh's captain of the guard and Joseph's master.' 8
Joseph is cast into prison, where he meets two palace employees,
the cupbearer and the baker, who have been discharged by the
king. He interprets their dreams as containing interwoven predictions; when these materialize, one of his new friends regains
his original position and eventually recommends Joseph to the
16. One generalization is that animal fables are less complex than sagas told about
human affairs. Simple truths might resonate better in animal tales because human characters may encourage audiences to identify with the tale and to perceive complexity.
Thus, wolves kill animals for their nourishment, but the fable format passes over this
complexity in a way that it could not if it dealt with a human who destroyed another
human in order to survive. Still, there are often animal fables on both sides of an issue.
In this way, animal fables will resonate with lawyers who are accustomed to opposing
doctrines.
Another link between animal fables and law is that these fables often camouflage
criticism of humans, which is to say that these fables are often a form of safe political
speech. The wolf may be understood to represent the master, the farm may be Stalin's
domain, and so forth. Indeed, an animal may be more recognizable than a single
human representation. Over time, the very use of an animal might signal the simplicity
or the allegorical quality of the story.
The generalization about complexity is, of course, sometimes misleading. The
animal fables we have inherited may touch on complex legal rules only rarely, while
human-based sagas often do; but there are many cultures in which animal-based tales
are quite complex. And there is always the argument that we are culturally-bound in a
way that makes us appreciate complexity in human stories more readily than we do in
animal fables.
17. Genesis 39-41.
18. Not only is this story much like modem sagas, but it is said to have a close
analogue in ancient Egyptian literature in "The Story of the TWo Brothers." That story,
however, is so rich and disjointed that it might contain any number of other stories,
including the tales of Adam and Eve and a variety of those found in Greek mythology.
See MIRIAM LIcHTHEIM, 2 ANCIENT EGYPTIAN LrTERATuRE: THE NEW KINGDOM 203-

11 (1976).
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Pharaoh when the need for an interpreter of dreams again arises.
Even if we take few liberties with the plain text, the story has
multiple layers of wrongful discharge and other relevant material. There is the topical problem of distinguishing between false
and honest claims regarding unwanted sexual advances. And
there is the question of strict liability versus negligence because,
at least as legend would have it, the cupbearer was held strictly
liable for a fly in the wine while the baker, who was more likely
to have been negligent, was hanged rather than rehabilitated.
Potiphar imprisoned Joseph much as the families in our more
modem sagas discharge domestic employees. The mistaken or
even wrongful discharge puts Joseph in the right place at the
right time; we are permitted to slide by the question of an appropriate remedy once we are convinced that the discharged person
was accused falsely. Indeed, we have the feeling that Joseph's
talents as an interpreter and administrator were sufficiently great
that it made no difference whether he continued to be regarded
as one who had misbehaved earlier toward his first master's wife.
There are enough morals for diverse congregations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

I have insisted that these stories converge on and point to
vulnerable legal rules. An alternative claim might be that they
converge on instances where there is tension between ex ante
rulemaking and ex post realities-which is to say, between rules
set down in advance and the realities that become known later
on. In the immigration context, for example, visas are issued in
advance, in ignorance of a person's performance on American
soil. Discharge in bankruptcy looks troubling when we see the
debtor thriving ex post, following the fresh start. 19 Thus, there is
a sense in many of these contexts that the law rushes too quickly
to fashion ex ante rules-and then creates discomfort as people
observe subsequent developments. This observation, however,
does not apply to those cases involving asymmetric information
(and disclosure regarding real estate development), unrewarded
inventors, and government takings. So, in the interest of economy, I prefer to focus on vulnerability and instability rather than
19. It is possible, of course, that we should be heartened by the thriving debtor,
whose success might be traced to removal of the interest costs associated by earlier
debts. Here, as is often the case, moral intuitions seem fueled by ex post observations.
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ex ante and ex post rulemaking. 20 Either way, I am suggesting
something different from the conventional, contemporary emphasis on the value of narratives or storytelling to lawyers. I
hope that by drawing attention to real legal (and perhaps moral)
problems, alongside contemporary theoretical issues, I have
identified a rich source of materials for further thought.

20. Another ex ante/ex post example involves stories about inventors who turn
down offers to share royalties. They lose and someone else earns a fortune. In a way, I
think the "moral" rule might be a sharing scheme, but our laws eschew sharing in favor
of winner-takes-all. This provides yet another example of the ex ante/ex post point as
to the design of rules and their subsequent reception. Similarly, when governments
take or regulate private property, there are often fortunes made and lost because of the
applicable (and perhaps chaotic) legal rules.
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